Abstract-In the attack of power Cyber Physical System (CPS), the key problem of taking effective response to the defense measures is how to extract the attack path quickly and accurately. This paper proposes an attack path extraction model based on Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Firstly, the original state sequence of information communication system and electric system must be processed by the representing, filtering, segmenting and fusion, then receiving the joint sequence of system failure that produced by the same attacker; Secondly, on the basis of the designed mapping table between information physics cooperative attack and system failure, system failure probability matrix can be generated dynamically. Meanwhile, the concept of sensitivity matrix is introduced to quantitative analyze the interaction effects between information attacks and physical attacks. Finally, the implementation algorithm of the model is given. The experimental results show that the proposed model can effectively extract the most likely sequence of attack path based on the known sequence of the system failure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information communication system and the physical system closely fused in the modern power system that from the complex coupling network, many scholars regard this system as power CPS. This change makes the grid attack is no longer isolated or a single form, it has consist of coordinated attack sequence that has certain timing and complex relationship [1] . The typical attack process can be illustrated as follows: the malicious attackers intrude EMS or SCADA secondary information system through virus, script, brute force and other means of hacker, this process can be called for the original information attack [2] . After the invasion succeed, the attacker will achieve advanced operating permissions of related system, and then the attacker will sends a error decision order, that resulting in physical system abnormalities in the power grid, this process can be called secondary physical attack.
Such a new form attacks that oriented power CPS has the following characteristics: 1) it has a clear attack target; 2) the power grid operation will be damaged in different degrees; 3) the attacker intent to design a complex attack sequence. Only a clear grasp of the complete attack steps in order to establish an active information security defense strategy, therefore, the key problem of achieving security defense is how to extract the attack sequences [3] . Based on the above analysis, this paper designs the attack path extraction model based on Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The basic idea can be described as follows: To begin with, the original state sequence of information communication system and electric system must be processed by the representing, filtering, segmenting and fusion, then receiving the joint sequence of system failure that produced by the same attacker. What's more, on the basis of the designed mapping table between information physics cooperative attack and system failure, system failure probability matrix can be generated dynamically. Meanwhile, the concept of sensitivity matrix is introduced to quantitative analyze the interaction effects between information attacks and physical attacks. At last, the experimental results show that the model has better effect on the attack path dependence [4] .
II. POWER CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEM ATTACK PATH EXTRACTION MODEL DEFINITION
According to HMM model, this paper defines the attack path extraction model, it can be represented by a five tuple W=<N, M,  , B, A>. b is the probability of a class of system failure is caused by an attack at some point. Attacks may occur in the power generation, transmission, substation, distribution, electricity or any link against the power CPS. Although the attack scene is different, the overall form and process is basically the same [5] . Therefore, in the study, we select the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in power network as the analysis object of information system operation state, in the transmission link we select the Energy Management System (EMS) as the analysis object of grid operation state [6] . The construction of the model is divided into three main stages: 1) Getting the joint sequence of system failure produced by the same attacker; 2) Designing mapping table between information physics cooperative attack and system failure, then constructing the probability matrix of system failure based on the above mapping table; 3) Determine the sensitivity matrix of the interaction effects between information attacks and physical attacks. The process of the model building is shown in Fig. 1 
A. Getting the Joint Sequence of System Failure
Produced by the Same Attacker In order to extraction the path of information physics cooperative attack, the first work need to get all system failure sequence produced by the same attacker [7] . Considering information attack sequence and fault sequence of power grid operation come from different systems: IDS and EMS, there are great differences existed in the content and performance of the two system. The following four steps are designed to obtain the joint sequence of the system failure sequence generated by the same attacker.
Step 1: Symbolic representation of the state monitoring sequence
The representation of monitoring sequence "IS" of the information system. Such monitoring sequence is realtime achieved through the deployment of IDS between the power intranet and extranet boundary. Each record contains the following information: T (time), IP (the IP address of attack source), Hostname, M (system failure), Event (the attack event), Sig_name (alert name) Sig _pri (alert priority), the sequence of attributes set is expressed as:
The representation of monitoring sequence "OS" of the state of power grid operation. Through the EMS system according to the telemetry, real-time statistics information, we can judge the running state of the transmission system. Each record contains the following information: T (time), StationName (the station name), Device (equipment device), M (system failure), Value (actual value or difference value), Exception_type (abnormal information type), the sequence of attributes set is expressed as:
Step 2: Filtering the state monitoring sequence to obtain the sequence of system failure Fault information and the normal operation information are contained in the sequence of state monitoring sequence, we focus on the analysis of all kinds of sequence of system failure. The state sequence "IS" and "OS" are respectively processed based on the filtering rule that setting the threshold, all the normal operation information can be eliminated.
Step 3: segmenting the sequence of system failure The sequence of information system failure is divided according to the IP address attribute, we can obtain independent subset IS n of information system failure. Similarly, the sequence of physical system failure is divided according to the StationName attribute, we can obtain independent subset OS m of power grid operation failure.
Step 4: getting the joint sequence of system failure Information system failure sequence subset IS n and power grid operation failure sequence subset OS m are sorted respectively according to the Time attribute. By setting the time window threshold t d , the starting and stopping time interval for the sequence IS n is   
If the sequence can meet any of the above conditions, that is to say, the occurrence of the two sequences is related to a large degree, IS n and OS m will be merged. According to Time attribute the merged sequence can be new sorted, we will get a joint sequence of system failure generated by the same attacker K step attack. Expressed as
B. Determine Probability Matrix of the System Failure
(1) The mapping table between information physics cooperative attack method and system failure According to the evaluation index of electric power enterprise information and communication process, also the security evaluation standard or specification in the electric secondary system, combing the experience of the experts in this area [8] , we sort out a list of common attack methods for power CPS, a mapping table of information physics cooperative attack method and system failure, as shown in Table I, Table II. (2) The calculation of the probability matrix of the system failure The probability matrix of the system failure B can be computed through importing Table I and Table II 
C. Determine the Sensitivity Matrix A of the Interaction
Effects between Information Attack and Physical Attack The methods by the attacker selected to attack the power CPS are often diversity [9] , therefore, for the analysis of the current attack path, a single analysis of information or physical risk factors is far from enough [10] . This paper presents the sensitivity matrix of the interaction effects between information attack and physical attack to resolve attack path characteristics issues [11] . Due to the problem of solving the sensitivity matrix can be abstracted into HMM state transition matrix to solve the problem [12] , so we use the Forward-Backward algorithm to calculate the sensitivity matrix in a time stamp [13] . It is very important to select the appropriate value in the initialization of the sensitivity matrix. According to the knowledge of the expert knowledge and experience, the initial sensitivity table is sorted out, as shown in Table III .
The initialization of the interaction sensitivity matrix A can be calculated through importing Table III, among {} ij a  A , row vector and column vector are all represent the number of attack method. After the completion of the initial matrix construction, it is necessary to carry out training A, the training process is as follows: 1) Pre sensitivity calculation before system attack The sensitivity of the system before the attack indicates that the t moments are satisfied with the attack state X i , and the a moments (including the t moment) meet the probability of a given attack sequence   1 2 3 , , , t n n n n determined by historical data. The calculation of sensitivity ( | ) t PN  before the system attack need to pass two steps:
Step one: pre sensitivity initialization 1 () i bn represents the probability of an attack state n 1 at the initial time result in the system failure.
Step two: the induction algorithm of the conditional probability.
By the results of pre initialization sensitivity, combined with the actual data of the power CPS, we can get the following formula by using Forward Algorithm, which can be used to find out the sensitivity of the system before the attack:
2) Post sensitivity calculation after system attack With similar to the calculation of sensitivity before the system attack, the sensitivity of the system after the attack at time t meet the attack state X i , and the probability of a given attack sequence
determined by the historical data.
The calculation of sensitivity () t i  after the system attacks requires two steps:
Step one: set constraint conditions of post sensitivity
It represents the sum of the post sensitivity in each time is 1, that is to say, the sensitivity contains in the set of information physical attack sequence.
Step two: the induction algorithm of post sensitivity
3) The calculation of sensitivity matrix A This probability is obtained by the pre sensitivity and post sensitivity. 
V. ATTACK PATH EXTRACTION EXAMPLE ANALYSIS
In order to verify the effect of attack path extraction model, we design and set up an attack experiment simulation environment, as shown in Fig. 3 . The environment include Snort system (open source IDS system), it be used to collect all kinds of analog information of attack warning and system failure results. At the same time, we obtained 7 days EMS system data from the actual power operation in a provincial electric power company, the data include telemetry, remote communication and information statistics [14] . Through the data playback technology to achieve all the running state of the EMS history data playback, we simulate the attacker tamper with the control instruction and state information, or implement all kinds of physical attacks [15] . We record all kinds of system failure sequence in the attack process [16] .
In the experimental environment, the information attack and physical attack are used to combine the cooperative attack method. The sum of simulated and attacked is 15 times. The experiment mainly includes 3 stages:
Stage 1: Launch information physical cooperative attack. The attack sequence such as I3-E1-E3 (attack means in the Table I , the actual sequence of the attack path in the Table II), the sequence length from the 3 step to the 6 step.
Stage 2: System failure sequence acquired. According to the original monitoring state sequence in the IDS and EMS, the joint system failure sequence were obtained through the filtering, segmentation and fusion processing, (the system failure sequence in the Table IV) .
Stage 3: Attack path extraction. According to the table  2 and table 3 , respectively, the system failure probability matrix B and interactive impact sensitivity matrix A is determined. Based on these parameters, the model of attack path extraction built to calculate the possible attack path (see Table IV for extracting attack path). -E1-E3  F8-F1-F2  I3-E1-E3  2  I3-E2-E7  F8-F1-F2  I3-E2-E6  3  I4-E2-E7  F9-F1-F4  I3-E2-E7  4  I2-E4-E2  F10-F2-F5  I2-E4-E2  5  I8-I5-E1  F11-F9-F7  I8-I5-E1  6  I7-E2-E7-E6  F8-F1-F4-F3  I7-E2-E7-E6  7  I7-I4-E3-E9  F8-F9-F2-F3  I7-I4-E3-E9  8  I5-I8-E1-E4  F9-F11-F4-F5  I5-I8-E1-E3  9  I2-E4-E5-E2  F10-F5-F6-F7  I2-E4-E5-E2  10  I4-E4-E8-E5  F12-F2-F4-F6  I4-E4-E8-E6  11  I3-E2-E7-E4-E5 F8-F1-F2-F5-F6  I3-E2-E7-E4-E5  12  I4-E4-E5-E2-E7 F9-F2-F3-F5-F2  I4-E7-E5-E3-E7   13  I8-E2-E3-E4-E7  F11-F1-F2-F3-F4  I8-E1-E3-E4-E7   14  I4-E2-E9-E3-E6-E5   F9-F1-F2-F5-F6-F7   I4-E2-E5-E3-E9-E5   15  I8-E3-E5-E7-E2-E6   F11-F2-F3-F4-F5-F6 I8-E3-E6-E7-E1-E6 Note: A border attack method means that the extraction of attack path is error.
According to the data on Table IV , web graph of the relationship between the transformation of the attack method is constructed. Two strong correlation attacks (E2-E5-E7，I2-E4) can be found in the graph, as shown in Fig. 4 Fig . 5 shows that, with the increase of the attack sequence length, the accuracy of the extraction path shows a downward trend, the accuracy rate of extraction path reached 86.7% in the 3 step attack sequence. The accuracy of the extraction path is basically the same in the 4 step and the 5 step attack sequence, which is 90.2% and 81.4% respectively, when the 6 step is reached 66.7%.
The main reasons for the change are as following: At first, with the increase of the attack sequence length, the attack target and the means by the attacker used are more and more obvious. Therefore, the accuracy of the extraction path is also promoted. But when the attack sequence reaches a certain length, the probability of the attacker's target transfer is increased. It is possible to be mixed with different attempts to attack in the sequences, this is the reason for the decline in the accuracy of attack sequence extraction. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
With the deep integration of power information system and physical system, the new cooperative attack mode has brought serious challenges to the security and stability of power system. This paper proposed an attack path extraction model based on HMM in power CPS, the model can automatic extract the most likely attack strike path, according to the change of the system failure state sequence.
